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Legality (1) |
Legitimate Grounds (2) |
Necessity (3) |
Proportionality (4) |
Public Interest speech (5) |
There is no crime of opinion (6) |
Actual Malice (7) |
Burden of proof (8) |
Only Civil Law (9) |
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Restrictions must be provided by law *1* |
Sufficient precision *2* |
Suitability and legitimate purpose of the restriction: rights, reputation of others & national security, public order, public health or morals *3* |
Necessity (in a democratic society): the existence of a ‘pressing social need’, the restrictions must be required by a compelling governmental interest and framed as not to limit the freedom of speech more than is necessary *4* |
Proportionality: Proportionate to interest to be protected *5* |
Speech involving public officials / candidates / public figures / or be of public interest is a specially protected speech *6* |
Prohibition against the criminalization of subjective opinions or value judgment *7* |
In cases involving matters of public interest punishment should not be rendered without proving the intent of inflict harm, was fully aware that false news disseminated or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determinate the truth or falsity *8* |
At all stages the burden of proof must fall on the party who brings the criminal (or civil) proceedings *9* |
A public official, a public person or a private person who has voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest can only use civil law to protect their honor or reputation *10* |
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| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | ECHR, Gutierrez Suarez v. Spain.
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| 5 |
ECHR, Otegi Mondragon v. Spain: “54. Turning to the expressions themselves, the Court accepts that the language used by the applicant could have been considered provocative. However, while any individual who takes part in a public debate of general concern – like the applicant in the instant case – must not overstep certain limits, particularly with regard to respect for the reputation and rights of others, a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation, is permitted; in other words, a degree of immoderation is allowed (see Mamère, cited above, § 25). “ ECHR, Gutierrez Suarez v. Spain.
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| 6 | ECHR, Gutierrez Suarez v. Spain.
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| 7 |
ECHR, Gutierrez Suarez v. Spain. Rejecting the main allegation by the Spanish courts—that the headline was insulting—the ECHR stated that “it was not its task [ECHR’s], or that of the domestic courts, to determine which journalistic techniques should be used and that journalistic freedom covered recourse to a degree of exaggeration.” 36. Concernant la première question, le Tribunal suprême soutenait que c’était dans les titres de l’information et non dans l’information elle-même où se trouvait l’atteinte à l’honneur : les titres de l’information en cause pouvaient, selon le Tribunal suprême, provoquer chez le lecteur la croyance que la famille royale marocaine était complice d’un trafic illégal de haschisch. Le Tribunal constitutionnel exposa en outre dans sa décision que la protection constitutionnelle de l’information ne pouvait pas s’étendre à des titres qui, en raison de leur brièveté, avaient pour but de semer des doutes chez le public sur l’honorabilité des personnes auxquelles il avait été fait référence dans l’information. Si l’on pouvait à cet égard déceler dans les titres de l’information (paragraphe 6 ci-dessus) une intention claire de s’attirer des lecteurs, il convient de rappeler qu’un compte-rendu journalistique peut emprunter des voies diverses en fonction du moyen de communication – et du sujet – dont il s’agit : il n’appartient pas à la Cour, ni aux juridictions nationales d’ailleurs, de se substituer à la presse pour dire quelle technique les journalistes doivent adopter (Bladet Tromsø et Stensaas, précité, § 63). Les titres de l’information prétendaient certes attirer l’attention des lecteurs sur des faits exposés dans le corps de l’information faisant le lien entre un trafic des stupéfiants déjà constaté et la famille royale marocaine. Il s’agissait toutefois de faits véridiques, soulignés dans les titres – et où résidait précisément l’intérêt de l’information –, que les cinq tonnes de haschich avaient été découvertes dans une cargaison d’une société appartenant à cette famille. La Cour estime qu’il faut lire le titre de l’information et son contenu dans leur ensemble, tenant compte tant du caractère véridique des faits que de l’effet d’attirer l’attention des lecteurs recherché avec le titre. Elle rappelle à cet égard que la liberté journalistique comprend aussi le recours possible à une certaine dose d’exagération, voire de provocation (Prager et Oberschlick, précité, § 38 et Bladet Tromsø et Stensaas, précité, § 59). |
| 8 |
See Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. Principle 10. “[…] In addition, in these cases [cases in which the person offended is a public official, a public person or a private person who has voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest], it must be proven that in disseminating the news, the social communicator had the specific intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that false news was disseminated, or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determine the truth or falsity of such news.” Also, se Kimel Vs. Argentina ¶ 78 and Tristan Donoso Vs. Panama ¶ 120. |
| 9 |
It is a consequence of the standard of actual malice. See Kimel Vs. Argentina ¶ 78 and Tristan Donoso Vs. Panama ¶ 120. |
| 10 |
This standard has only been affirmed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. For example the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. Principle 10. “[…] The protection of a person’s reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions in those cases in which the person offended is a public official, a public person or a private person who has voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest.” On the other side, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in Tristan Donoso Vs. Panamá. ¶ 118. “The Court has pointed out that public officials, in as much the same manner as any other individual, enjoy the protection of the provisions of Article 11 of the Convention, which enshrines the right to honor. Moreover, Article 13(2)(a) of the Convention sets forth that the “reputations of others” may be grounds to impose subsequent liability for such an exercise of freedom of expression as attains them. Likewise, the incrimination instrument is adequate since it is aimed at safeguarding – through the penalties established – the interest that it is meant to protect; i.e. it could be suitable to contribute to attaining such end.” See also Kimel Vs. Argentina ¶ 71. |
