“Luanda Book Club” Activists
Facts – In June 2015, 17 Angolan activists attended a “book club” in Luanda, Angola. Fifteen of them were arrested and arraigned on various charges including incitement charges under Angola’s penal code. The Angolan interior minister was quoted as saying that the activists were arrested for “disrupting public order and security,” although numerous reports indicate that the only acts the defendants were engaged in was “reading.” In December, 2015, they were all put under house arrests with 10 police officers guarding each. On March 28, 2016, the activists were finally convicted on various charges including “ preparatory actos of rebellion” and "criminal conspiracy." They received sentences ranging between two-year prison sentence and eight-year prison sentences. They were also sentenced to pay fines of approximately 300 USD in a country where the average Angolan makes around 2 USD per day. On June 29, 2016, they were conditionally released following a decision by the Angolan Supreme Court. They are not allowed to leave the country and should check in with police once per month while they wait for their appeal decision. In October 2016, after more than one year of legal ordeal and arrests, they were all granted amnesty by the country's courts.
Issue – Are the arrest, conviction, and sentencing of the activists under the laws of the Republic of Angola compliant with international incitement law standards?
Rule – Under the Universal Standard of the ICCPR, incitement laws must not stifle freedom of expression. The test is six-prong. The first prong (legality) requires that the restrictions on freedom of expression are provided by law and must not be over broad. The second prong requires legitimate grounds – grounds include rights of others, or national security, public order, public health, or morals. The third prong (necessity) requires that the restrictions must be necessary for a legitimate purpose, and must be the only way to achieve protection. The forth prong (proportionality) – restrictions must not be overbroad, must be the least intrusive instrument necessary to achieve the protective function, and must be proportionate to the interest being protected. The fifth prong (intent) requires the existence of intent, specifically, the intent to incite discrimination, hostility, or violence. The sixth prong (causation) requires causation between the expression and threat.
Analysis – First prong: (1) Legality – Angola’s rebellion incitement law is formalized under sections 315 of the Angolan penal code. However, the provision is over broad and not sufficiently precise. For example, Section 315(1) states that “[w]hoever, by illegal means, performs any act which, directly or indirectly, modifies, in whole or in part, the constitutional law and subverts the state institutions established by it shall be punished....” Including the term “illegal means” in a statute designed to articulate prohibited behavior amounts to circular reasoning and permits unfettered interpretations of the statute. In this case, it is not clear how attending a meeting where “reading” occurred amounted to an “illegal mean” or led (directly or indirectly) to the subversion of state institutions. Under the statute and its application in this case, almost any act could be deemed to be a violation of Angola’s incitement laws. Angola’s incitement laws are not sufficiently precise and therefore, this prong fails.
Second prong: (2) Legitimate grounds – Following the arrests of the activists, Angola’s interior minister attempted to convey the legitimate grounds for their detention by postulating its necessity as a means of preserving “public order and security.” However, there is no indication that any of the activists engaged in any act that threatened public order or security. As noted the activists were simply attending a book club and were reading and discussing a book. Furthermore, while Section 315 of the Angolan penal code criminalizes “subverting” state intuitions, it does not articulate the types of behaviors that would threaten public order or national security and thus legitimize restrictions on particular forms of expression. Reports indicate that the activists were reading and discussing a book about peaceful democratic political activism. Criminalizing this “behavior” is not a legitimate ground for restricting freedom of expression, as it does not engender threats to public order or national security. Therefore, this prong fails.
Third prong: (3) Necessity – The arrests, arraignments, and eventual convictions of the activists were not based on legitimate grounds, therefore it follows that the actions of the Angolan government could not have been necessary. International law requires that in their incitement law, states only employ restrictive measures necessary for legitimate purposes, and that they be the only way to achieve the protective function. In this case, the Angolan government is restricting reading and discussion by imprisoning the activists. Even if public order and security were invoked, and there is no indication that they were, this cannot be the only way of maintaining public order and security. The actions of the Angolan government are therefore unnecessary and this prong fails.
Forth prong: (4) Proportionality – The arrests, arraignments, and eventual convictions of the activists were not based on legitimate grounds, nor were they necessary, therefore it follows that the actions of the Angolan government could not have been proportional. The activists were sentenced to lengthy prison sentences for simply reading and discussing a book. Moreover, the statute they were charged under calls for lengthy prison sentences for indeterminate acts open to broad interpretation by Angolan authorities. International law calls for states to employ the least restrictive measures when restricting expression. Even if the charges in this case sought to protect legitimate state interests (an unconvincing proposition) and detention was a necessitated corollary to “reading”, the length of the activists’ pre judgment detention and draconian convictions hardly satisfy the “least restrictive” test mandated by international human rights law. Therefore, this prong fails.
Fifth prong: (5) Intent – The intent requirement, namely the intent to incite discrimination, hostility, or violence requirement, is absent from Angola’s incitement law. In this case, there is no indication that any of those intentions existed. Angolan authorities failed to demonstrate that any of the activists had any intent to “incite violence”. Therefore, this prong fails.
Sixth prong: (6) Causation – In this case, the activists were charged and convicted based on the peaceful act of reading and discussing a book. There was no threat associated with their actions and the court failed to demonstrate any causation between their act and any threat to the public order. Therefore, this prong fails.
Conclusion – The fact that the Angolan laws and their application by the courts do not comply with the six-prong test analyzed above renders the Republic of Angola as non-compliant with the universal standard on incitement.
